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Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, former commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, reportedly coined the expression "crossing the Mogadishu line" while describing the key dilemma faced by UN troops in Bosnia: how do armed peacekeepers maintain the appearance of neutrality in the midst of civil war while achieving the political objectives for which they were sent? Indeed, when one considers the difficulties the United States has experienced in a long string of recent interventions, to include Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkan wars of Bosnia and Kosovo, the historical record suggests that the solution to this dilemma has yet to be identified.
Like General Rose above, one can easily identify the key problem faced by the peacekeepers; the tougher challenge is to identify those component factors which conspire to complicate, frustrate, or even terminate a humanitarian mission before achieving the political ends desired. How then does one provide clarity to what is obviously a very complex problem?
Numerous experts have, in fact, analyzed these interventions and subsequently published well considered "lessons learned" on what went wrong. Yet, despite these lessons learned, every intervention or limited war fought in the post-Cold War era has produced the same results: the desired political objectives were seldom achieved and those outcomes that were achieved were never entirely conclusive. This paper proposes to search for the reasons why by looking at the nature of modem limited war from the perspective of Carl von Clausewitz and his "remarkable trinity."
Some scholars and experts would undoubtedly oppose this approach as they consider the applicability of a Clausewitzian perspective, conceived in the era of Napoleon, to be irrelevant to modem day warfare. Writers such as Martin van Creveld and John Keegan assert that Clausewitz's trinitarian approach involving "the people, the army, and government," is an obsolete social paradigm no longer useful as an analytical tool.' This school of thought cites the demise of the nation state and the emergence of hostile ethnic/cultural populations, with the army and people fighting as one entity, as indicators of "non-trinitarian" future warfare. They go on to propose technological or cultural/ethnic based theories as better descriptors of the modem phenomenon of war.
However, the basic premise they use to reject Clausewitzian theory is flawed from the start as it fails to recognize the true essence of the Clausewitzian trinity; it is not simply a triangle made up of the people, armies, and nation states. Instead, the "remarkable trinity" encompasses a complex set of dialectical relationships between passions, military creativity, and rational political calculations for each party to a conflict. Furthermore, the one-dimensional cultural or technological theories fail to explain why great powers like the United States and Russia experience defeat in such places as Somalia and Chechnya. True theory should be applicable to every conflict.
Therefore, is the Clausewitzian trinity, properly understood, still relevant to modem day limited wars with limited political objectives? If so, then how does the trinitarian approach explain why recent UN interventions have failed to achieve the political objectives desired? To answer these questions, I'll examine the case of Somalia from the perspective of Clausewitz. In order to do this effectively it is first necessary to understand the background of the intervention prior to examining how the three elements of "the trinity" influenced the outcome. of the "remarkable trinity," it is first necessary to understand properly the three components of the trinity before applying them to each of the three operations listed above.
CLAUSEWITZ AND THE TRINITY
In his classic book On War, Clausewitz defines the phenomenon of war as a "remarkable trinity" at the end of Book One:
"War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity-composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone." not so blessed. Finally, the government is matched with the rational force of calculation which subjects policy to reason. Thus, Clausewitz inserts his famous maxim that "war is an instrument of policy" into the calculus of war, though he cautions the military commander that "rational" policy is not always the policy put forth by the government: "That (policy) can err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor there.. .here we can only treat policy as representative of all interests of the community." 6 It is also important to note that his conception of the trinity applies equally to all sides of a conflict and that all three elements are variable in their relationship with one another. Moreover, in conflicts involving alliances or multi-lateral institutions such as the UN, one must apply the trinity to each of the parties involved, thereby significantly complicating the analysis but also highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of this type construct on war.
Interestingly, Clausewitz suggests that one must strike a balance between the three elements of the trinity "like an object suspended between three magnets." 7 This is a useful simile because it graphically demonstrates the dialectical relationship between elements of the trinity and the very reason why war is so dynamic and unpredictable. The path of a swinging pendulum suspended between three magnets is never determined by the force of one magnet alone; instead, the path is determined by a shifting interaction of forces from all three magnets, resulting in a non-linear path. So, too, is the conduct of war. With this background, let us view UNOSOM I from the perspective of the trinity.
PHASE ONE-UNOSOM I
Between January and August 1992, the UN Security Council passed five resolutions (733, 746,751,767 and 775) In an election year, the U.S. share of the costs estimated for a larger force was thought to be unpalatable to the Congress, particularly in view of the decision made two months earlier to create UNPROFOR in Croatia at an estimated cost of $630million. 1 Thomas and Spataro, 179. armed force as a policy tool of the UN effectively changed the entire complexion of the intervention. How would Clausewitz view the UNOSOM I situation through the perspective of his "remarkable trinity?"
General Colin Powell's memoirs provide an excellent portrayal of one element of Clausewitz's trinity, the desire of the American people to do something to help:
"...but television hovered over Somalia and wrenched our hearts, night after night, with images of people starving to death before our eyes. The UN had planted a humanitarian relief effort there, and the United States.. .provided C-130 transports to fly in food. We rarely knew what happened to the relief supplies. Local warlords stole the food from warehouses. They hijacked relief agency trucks. The UN effort was practically at a standstill, while images of the fleshless limbs and bloated bellies of dying children continued to haunt us."'12
If world opinion was mobilized to support the humanitarian effort, why then was the UN at a standstill unable to achieve the two political objectives which precipitated the intervention? The answer lies in the linkage between the third element, represented by the UN forces, with that of the UN or government element. Certainly, the US troops in the Joint Task
Force and the 500 Pakistani troops authorized under Resolution 767 were highly motivated to help the people of Somalia. The fundamental problem was that the deployed UNOSOM force structure was inadequate to effect a change in the security situation; they were vastly outmanned and outgunned by Somalia's clans whose warlords were locked in a struggle for power. If one recalls Clausewitz's assertion that "the political objective is the goal, war (or the use of force) is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose," 13 then it is clear that the UNOSOM trinity was not in balance. Thus, the political objectives were unlikely to be achieved. Interestingly, a number of Somalis did propose an alternative to "more troops," to the first UN Special Representative to Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun. They proposed that former western-trained policemen, numbering almost 15,000, help provide security assistance to UN forces; unfortunately, the idea was never approved by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. 14 Consequently, with the "commander's creative proposal" ignored, a bad situation grew worse.
"By the end of 1992, many Somalis felt they had been forsaken by the world. The feeling was reinforced by the 8-month UN effort that had done nothing to address the overriding problem of in the eyes of the Somali people. At this point, Clausewitz would observe that "the trinity" had returned to a state of balance, with the passions of the people, the rational policies subjected to reason by the governments (UN/US), and the play of chance and creativity within UNITAF all reasonably in sync. Security was improving and the food was flowing into the country.
The critical factor during this phase was the successful implementation of the UNITAF Rules of Engagement (ROE). In attempting to finesse the issue of the armed militias controlled by the warlords, LGEN Johnston issued a set of ROE remarkable for their simplicity: no technicals (e.g., trucks mounted with machine guns); no banditry; no roadblocks; and no visible 20 Ibid., 565.
21 Allard, 16. 22 Thomas and Spataro, 184. 23 This effort to establish an auxiliary interim police force was accomplished without legal precedent or mandate from the UN. The UNITAF Commanders and UN Special Envoy Robert Oakley pushed through the effort and within months the ASF became popular with the local population as Somalis began to look after Somalis. Notably, the UN Secretary-General, Security Council, and other governments to include the weapons. UNITAF was authorized to employ "all necessary force" to confiscate and disarm heavy weapons in the UNITAF operating areas while light weapons were not to be confiscated from the clans if they were not carried on the streets.
Concerning the technicals, the question quickly arose whether "all necessary force" meant shoot on sight. "Johnston decided it did not and directed commanders to challenge and approach the technicals, using all necessary force if the weapons were not voluntarily surrendered.", 24 These rules, combined with the overwhelming force of UNITAF, resulted in the virtual disappearance of weaponry from the streets within several weeks. Clausewitz would have applauded General Johnston's approach, for it recognized and neutralized the key Somali center of gravity which threatened his mission of providing humanitarian relief: the armed militias and their technicals. This concentration of force at the Somali center of gravity additionally addressed the necessity to neutralize the warlords slowly, but in a way which would not threaten their political aspirations. In Clausewitzian terms, this exemplifies a commander's genius at work.
Looking back on the entire intervention, Clausewitz would further observe that Johnston's interpretation of the ROE and decision when to use force would dictate the culminating point for the UN intervention; as soon as the ROE was changed in UNOSOM II, the UN was placed back on the defensive with "the trinity" again out of balance. To illustrate this point, consider if the alternative approach "shoot on sight" had been applied and the Marines had started to attack the technicals "on sight." Clearly, the impact on both sides would have been significant, as the events of UNOSOM II would soon prove.
Phase III -UNOSOM II US did little or nothing to offer recognition or provide financial support for the expansion of police and judicial/penal systems. Thus, the success of the ASF varied from region to region. disconcerting was the fact that UNOSOM II only had about 4500 U.S. troops with which to back up the ROE and accomplish the newly expanded mission. The means, again, were no longer sufficient to achieve the policy. Equally alarming was the demise of the Somali ASF:
27 "UNOSOM II did not have any CIVPOL on its staff to manage the ASF and had no funds to pay them. Military personnel were removed from the ASF stations and joint patrolling 24 Allard, 36, 37. 25 General Zinni provides the perspective of "the guy on the ground" in response to the building pressure in Washington to physically disarm the Somalis. Zinni recalls on page 255 of Capital "W" War the following: "First of all, arms in Somalia is like 'crack cocaine' on the streets of Washington, D.C. I don't have a clue how much is there, but I'm sure it's a lot. And I know for sure that if I go house-to-house, building to building and attempt to take weapons in that manner, physically disarm Somalis, two things are going to happen. I'm going to piss off the Somali people. And I'm going to take casualties while killing a lot of Somalis in the process. alarm that the UN peacekeepers had already crossed "the Mogadishu line;" the peacekeepers were no longer "neutrals." Regrettably, no one else observed the changing dynamics of the affected trinities and unintended consequences soon followed.
On June 5 th, less than one month after UNOSOM II took command, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed during an unannounced inspection of a suspected arms cache and radio station belonging to Aideed. In response, the Security Council passed Resolution 837 condemning the attack and calling for the "arrest and detention" of the perpetrators. For Admiral Howe and UNOSOM, the arrest of Aideed became the focal point of the intervention at precisely the time when the psychological dimension of war began to play a larger and larger role in the decisions made; it was only a matter of time before one of the fiercest firefights in the history of the U.S. Army would take place. To understand why 18 American Rangers and Special Forces 28 Thomas and Spataro, 202. 29 Allard, 37. soldiers were killed at the Battle of the Black Sea in Mogadishu, one needs only to understand the impact of the recent UN political decisions on the Somali trinity.
One observer, recalling the tragic events of 3 October 1993, provides the Somali perspective:
"It had been easy to believe, prior to this day, that the Somali warlord Aideed lacked broad popular support. But this fight had turned into something akin to a popular uprising. It seemed like everyone in the city wanted suddenly to kill Americans. They were burning roadblocks everywhere."
30
The three elements of the Somali trinity were now in balance: the people were infused with primordial rage and passion; the warlords and clans were temporarily reunited with the common political goal of removing the UN from Somalia; and, General Aideed effectively mobilized his irregular army to confront the hated Rangers. Although suffering a tactical defeat on 3 October, the Somalis achieved a strategic victory on television the next several days as the bodies of several Americans were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu; within days, the United
States and UN would begin the process of withdrawing from Somalia.
In sum, an analysis of the UN intervention in Somalia in 1992-1995 demonstrates that Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity" remains relevant to the modem phenomenon of war--to include limited wars with limited political objectives. Secondly, the trinitarian approach helps explain why the political objectives in recent humanitarian interventions have not been achieved.
If one recalls Clausewitz's famous maxim that "war is a continuation of politics by other means,"
one could argue that war, or the decision to employ "force" as in Kosovo, is simply a continuation of the remarkable trinity that comprises politics. In other words, the trinity, which describes the phenomenon of war, is a duplicate of the trinity which describes the phenomenon of politics. Consider the following: in politics, you have an element of passion, in politics you have an element of chance, probability and friction (e.g., a recession), and in politics there is rational calculation and reason employed by decision makers. With wars of limited objectives, the linkage between the political trinity and the trinity of war is even tighter than that of a total war, which could help explain why limited wars with limited objectives are so inconclusive. In other words, one small change in the political trinity of a party has a disproportionate affect on the associated trinity of war. As was shown in Somalia, a simple political decision to disarm the clans had a profound impact on the trinities of both sides. Therefore, understanding the degree to which this political linkage affects wars of limited aims is perhaps the key lesson for statesmen and strategists to consider, as they seek to avoid crossing "the Mogadishu line" in future.
